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I. INTRODUCTION
As Justice Learned Hand once observed, it is “a totally different thing to search a man’s pockets and use against him what they
contain, from ransacking his house for everything which may incriminate him.”1 As Chief Justice Roberts explained in Riley v. California, that statement is no longer true, due to the advent of the
digital age and the proliferation of electronic devices containing
immense storage capabilities.2 It is much more likely in the modern
age that a man’s person will contain everything which may incriminate him, simply by the man’s possession of a modern digital storage device, such as a cell phone, computer, or external hard drive.3
In 2015, a survey conducted by the PEW Research Center revealed
that 92% of U.S. adults owned a cellphone, with 68% of U.S. adults
owning a “smartphone.”4 The survey also concluded 73% of U.S.
adults owned a desktop or laptop computer and 45% of U.S. adults

1. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490–91 (2014) (citing United States v.
Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1926)).
2.

Id. at 2491.

3.

See id.

4. Monica Anderson, Technology Device Ownership: 2015, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Oct.
29, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/10/29/technology-device-ownership-2015/.
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owned a tablet computer.5 These digital devices store personal and
private information in staggering amounts, a fact that has important consequences on a person’s right to privacy under the
Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “a safeguard to the liberty
of the individual,”6 by “protect[ing] citizens against unreasonable
governmental searches and seizures.”7 In defining what constitutes an unreasonable governmental search and seizure, the Supreme Court of the United States has identified several exceptions
to the Fourth Amendment’s broad protections. One of these exceptions to the Fourth Amendment is known as the private search doctrine, first highlighted in Walter v. United States,8 and further
elaborated in United States v. Jacobsen.9
The private search doctrine relies upon the premise that the
Fourth Amendment only applies to governmental action, not action
by private citizens.10 Therefore, if a private citizen, acting upon his
own volition and not at the behest of a governmental agent,
searches another person’s private personal property (in which the
person possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy) and finds incriminating material, the private citizen is permitted to disclose
that incriminating material to a government agent.11 The government agent is then permitted to search and seize the incriminating
material without first obtaining a warrant.12
The private search doctrine was initially introduced in relation to a private search of a physical container — a package

5.

Id.

6. NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 9 (1937).
7. THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH
INTERPRETATION xix (Carolina Academic Press, 2008).

AMENDMENT:

8.

Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 650 (1980).

9.

United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 112 (1984).

10.

Id. at 113.

11.

Id.

12.

Id.

ITS

HISTORY

AND
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shipped through FedEx.13 In the advent of the digital age, however,
the private search doctrine has been routinely applied to searches
of digital containers, such as computers, flash drives, cell phones,
and CDs.14 In applying the private search doctrine to digital containers, there has been some contention amongst the United States
Circuit Courts of Appeals regarding the proper determination of
permissible scope for the subsequent government search following
the initial private search.15 The specific issue of contention is how
to define the scope of the search and what constitutes a “container”
for purposes of determining what the government agent is permitted to search.16 Three options for defining the container have been
introduced amongst the various circuits, the district courts, and
legal scholars: the device itself, the individual file or image originally searched, or the exposed data of the individual file or image
(the data visible on the screen).17
The United States Circuit Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and
Seventh Circuits hold that the proper limitation of scope is to the
digital storage device itself.18 The reason for this holding is the assumption that when a private person searches the digital device,
by opening the device itself, the private person has frustrated any

13.

Id. at 111.

14. United States v. Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323, 1330 (11th Cir. 2015) (cell phone); United
States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 479 (6th Cir. 2015) (computer); United States v. Tosti,
733 F.3d 816, 818 (9th Cir. 2013) (computer); Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832, 833 (7th Cir.
2012) (ZIP drive and camera memory card); United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 451 (5th
Cir. 2001) (ZIP disks).
15. See Orin S. Kerr, 11th Circuit deepens the circuit split on applying the private
search doctrine to computers, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/12/02/11th-circuit-deepens-the-circuit-split-onapplying-the-private-search-doctrine-to-computers/.
16.

See id.

17. Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323; Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478; Tosti, 733 F.3d 816; Rann,
689 F.3d 832; Runyan, 275 F.3d 449; Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World,
119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 554 (Dec. 2005).
18.

See Rann, 689 F.3d 832; Runyan, 275 F.3d 499.
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remaining expectation of privacy in the device.19 Therefore, any
subsequent governmental action cannot be defined as a search for
Fourth Amendment purposes.20 The implication of this ruling is
that even if the private person has only searched one file on the
device, the entire device is open to the subsequent government investigation.21 The government agent can view any file, image, or
data on the device, without a warrant, even if it has not already
been viewed by the private searcher.22
The United States Circuit Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and
Eleventh Circuits, and the Ninth Circuit through dicta, hold the
Fifth and Seventh Circuits’s definition of container is too expansive
and in violation of the purpose of the Fourth Amendment.23 These
circuits instead hold that the proper definition of “container” is limited to the individual file or image searched by the private person
as part of the initial private search.24 The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits maintain the expansive storage capacity of modern digital devices and the improbability of virtual certainty in what those devices may contain mandates a stricter definition of “container,”
particularly in light of the important policy considerations regarding modern digital devices highlighted by the Supreme Court in
Riley v. California.25
As this article will make clear, the proper definition of “container” is the definition pronounced by the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits. This definition preserves and furthers the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment, properly takes into account the unique characteristics and implications of modern digital devices, appropriately balances the competing interests of governmental autonomy
and privacy protection, and befittingly incorporates the current

19.

See Rann, 689 F.3d 832; Runyan, 275 F.3d 499.

20.

See Rann, 689 F.3d 832; Runyan, 275 F.3d 499.

21.

See Rann, 689 F.3d 832; Runyan, 275 F.3d 499.

22.

See Rann, 689 F.3d 832; Runyan, 275 F.3d 499.

23.
821–22.

See Sparks, 806 F.3d at 1336; Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 491; Tosti, 733 F.3d at

24.
821–22.

See Sparks, 806 F.3d at 1336; Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 491; Tosti, 733 F.3d at

25. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. at 2490–91; Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 491;
Sparks, 806 F.3d at 1336.
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stance of the Supreme Court regarding privacy interests in the
modern digital age.
This comment will first briefly give background information
on the current circuit split issue by introducing the Fourth Amendment and the private search doctrine in general. It will then explore what it means to “exceed the scope of the private search” under the private search doctrine, by discussing the physical container distinction and then the digital zone distinction highlighted
by Orin S. Kerr. Next, this comment will examine how the various
circuit courts of appeals have applied the container distinction to
digital storage devices and advocate for the approach taken by the
Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh United States Circuit Courts of Appeals in limiting the digital container definition to an individual
file or image on the digital device. In explaining how the proper
definition of digital container is the individual file or image, this
comment will conclude with a discussion of the important policy
interests at stake on either side of the divide: the governmental
interest in investigating and prosecuting criminal activity and preserving digital evidence on one side, and the personal privacy interests on the other side in limiting erosion of the Fourth Amendment and arbitrary governmental interference with important privacy rights.
II. BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution was
enacted on September 25th, 1789, as part of the Bill of Rights, and
ratified on December 15th, 1791.26 The text of the amendment
states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,

26. Barry Friedman & Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment, NAT’L CONSTITUTION
CTR., http://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/amendments/amendment-iv (last
visited Nov. 9, 2016).
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and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.27
The Fourth Amendment was placed in the Constitution by our
Founding Fathers and the ratifying generation in response to colonial experiences with general warrants in an era of unchecked
power of the British government to “enter private homes and conduct dragnet searches for evidence of any crime.”28 In drafting the
Fourth Amendment, the Founding Fathers sought to ensure the
federal government lacked the power to conduct general and unreasonable searches and seizures, and so prohibited general warrants, mandated that all searches and seizures had to be reasonable, and required that only specific warrants detailing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized would be permitted.29
Over the last 224 years, the Supreme Court has sought to develop “a comprehensive set of rules regulating law enforcement” to
ensure the important policies of the Fourth Amendment are preserved in modern jurisprudence.30 Despite this dedication to preserving privacy interests, the Supreme Court has allowed for certain exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s protections including
the search-incident-to-lawful-arrest exception,31 the plain view
doctrine,32 the exigent circumstances exception,33 and the private
search doctrine,34 among others. This article specifically relates to
the private search doctrine and the permissible scope of the exception as applied to digital containers. To determine the permissible
scope, we need first to understand the private search doctrine in
general.

27.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

28.

Kerr, supra note 17, at 536.

29.

Id.

30.

Id.

31. PHILLIP A. HUBBART, MAKING SENSE OF SEARCH & SEIZURE LAW: A FOURTH
AMENDMENT HANDBOOK 268 (2015).
32.

Id. at 293.

33.

Id. at 294.

34.

Id. at 119–20.
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The private search doctrine is based on the premise that the
Fourth Amendment does not apply to actions taken by private citizens.35 It only applies to unreasonable governmental searches and
seizures.36 This principle was clearly shown in United States v. Jacobsen.37 Jacobsen presented the following issue: Is a government
agent permitted to search a person’s private property, without a
warrant, if the government agent is told by a private individual
that the property contains illegal substances, and that property
has already been inspected by the private individual?38
In Jacobsen, employees of a private freight carrier observed a
white, powdery substance in a package, which originally had been
wrapped in multiple layers, but which had become damaged and
partially opened during transit.39 The freight carrier supervisor
and employees unwrapped this package, found a tube inside made
of silver tape, cut open the tube, and found a series of Ziplock bags,
which all contained a white, powdery substance.40 The supervisor
notified the Drug Enforcement Administration, who sent an agent
to investigate the claim.41 Upon viewing the package, the DEA
agent removed the plastic bags from the tube, observed the white,
powdery substance inside, opened each of the four bags, and removed some of the substance.42 A field test on this substance revealed that the material was cocaine.43 Results from the field test

35.

United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).

36.

Id.

37. Id. (“This Court has also consistently construed this protection as proscribing
only governmental action; it is wholly inapplicable ‘to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the
participation or knowledge of any governmental official.’”).
38.

See id. at 113.

39.

Id. at 111.

40.

Id.

41.

Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 111.

42.

Id. at 111–12.

43.

Id. at 112.
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were used to obtain a warrant to search the address where the cocaine was to be sent, and that search resulted in the arrest of the
respondents on charges of possession of an illegal substance with
intent to distribute.44
At trial, respondents moved to suppress the evidence discovered through the DEA field test and the subsequent search of the
respondents’s address, arguing that the DEA agent’s search of the
package violated the respondents’s Fourth Amendment rights
against unreasonable governmental search and seizure.45 As such,
any warrant obtained as a result of the initial search was “the
product of an illegal search and seizure” and thus inadmissible at
trial.46 This motion was denied at the trial level but that decision
was reversed on appeal.47 The Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari to resolve the issue and ruled in favor of the
DEA, holding that “the federal agents did not infringe any constitutionally protected privacy interest that had not already been
frustrated as the result of private conduct.”48 The DEA search and
field test was “constitutionally reasonable.”49
United States v. Jacobsen was a landmark case for legal analysis under the Fourth Amendment because it conclusively established the private search doctrine.50 The Jacobsen majority also defined a “search” as occurring when “an expectation of privacy that
society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.”51 Relying
on earlier precedent set in Walter v. United States, the majority
conclusively decided that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to
private action, whether or not that action is reasonable.52 The importance of this ruling cannot be overstated; the Jacobsen majority

44.

Id.

45.

Id.

46.

Id.

47.

Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 112.

48.

Id. at 126.

49.

Id.

50.

See id. at 113; United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 481 (6th Cir. 2015).

51.

Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113.

52.

Id. (citing Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980)).
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opened the floodgates for admissibility of evidence obtained
through private searches by definitively holding that such searches
were not illegal.53 To illustrate the gravity of this decision, consider
the following hypothetical.
Johnny owns a computer which he regularly uses to view child
pornography. One day, while Johnny is out, Jane, Johnny’s girlfriend, takes his computer and discovers several files containing
child pornography. Jane turns Johnny’s computer into the police,
who then search the files Jane discovered. Under the Jacobsen ruling, Johnny has no ability to argue that the government search was
in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, even though the government agents searched his personal property without first obtaining a warrant. The typical warrant requirement for government searches and seizures is extinguished in Johnny’s case
simply because his property was first searched by Jane. If Johnny’s
property had not first been searched by Jane, the government
would have been required to obtain a search warrant before seizing
and inspecting the computer.
What accounts for the different treatment? The Jacobsen majority, in defining a “search” as occurring when a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy has been frustrated, by corollary, also
determined when a search does not occur under the Fourth Amendment.54 A “search,” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, does
not occur when a person does not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the property.55 When a private individual searches a person’s property, that private individual frustrates any remaining
expectation of privacy in the property.56 Therefore, any subsequent

53.

See id.

54.

See id. at 117.

55.

See id.

56.

See id.
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governmental investigation of the property cannot possibly fall under the Jacobsen definition of a “search.”57
Despite this permissive ruling, the Jacobsen majority did
place restrictions on the admissibility of evidence obtained through
private searches in two ways. First, the subsequent government
search cannot exceed the scope of the original private search.58 Additional invasions of a person’s privacy will be tested “by the degree
to which they exceed the scope of the private search.”59 Second, the
private searcher cannot be an “agent” of the government nor acting
at the behest of a government agent.60 In other words, the private
searcher must be truly private, and not influenced in any way by a
government agent or coerced into searching the private property
by a government agent or organization.61
These two caveats of the private search doctrine give rise to
numerous qualifying questions, particularly in the advent of the
digital age. It is the first caveat — the restriction that the subsequent government search cannot exceed the scope of the prior private search — that is under scrutiny in this article, and which
gives rise to a current circuit split.62 The question for consideration
57. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117 (“The Fourth Amendment is implicated only if the authorities use information with respect to which the expectation of privacy has not already been
frustrated.”).
58. Id. at 116 (“The Government may not exceed the scope of the private search unless it has the right to make an independent search.”).
59.

Id. at 115.

60. Id. at 113 (“This Court has also consistently construed this protection as proscribing only governmental action; it is wholly inapplicable ‘to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with
the participation or knowledge of any governmental official.’” (citing Walter v. United States,
447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980)).
61.

See id.

62. The current circuit split is between the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals
for the Fifth and Seventh Circuits on the one hand, and the United States Circuit Courts of
Appeals for the Sixth, Ninth (through dicta), and Eleventh Circuits on the other hand. Orin
Kerr, Sixth Circuit creates circuit split on private search doctrine for computers, WASH. POST
(May 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/20/sixthcircuit-creates-circuit-split-on-private-search-doctrine-for-computers/; Orin Kerr, 11th Circuit
deepens the circuit split on applying the private search doctrine to computers, WASH. POST (Dec.
2, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/12/02/11th-circuit-deepens-the-circuit-split-on-applying-the-private-search-doctrine-to-computers/.
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is “What does it mean to exceed the scope of a private search of a
digital device?”
III. EXCEEDING THE SCOPE OF THE PRIVATE SEARCH:
EXAMINING THE CONTAINER DISTINCTION
United States v. Jacobsen was decided in 1984, prior to the real
emergence of the digital age.63 In the 1980s and 1990s, cases involving the private search doctrine examined scope questions
largely related to searches of physical, non-digital forms of property, not digital material.64 Throughout these two decades, jurisprudence on the private search doctrine established the container
distinction for determining when the government agent exceeded
the scope of the initial private search.65 While the container distinction is appropriate in limiting searches of physical property, its
principles are unsuitable as applied to digital devices. This section
will outline the container distinction as applied to traditional, nondigital forms of property and explain the suggested alternatives to
applying the container distinction to digital devices, as created by
Orin S. Kerr.

A. Application of the Container Distinction to Traditional, NonDigital Forms of Property
Traditionally, precedent regarding the Fourth Amendment
has limited searches to discrete containers.66 In the physical, non-

63.

United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 111 (1984).

64. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 111 (1984) (search of wrapped package); State v. Dold,
44 Wash. App. 519, 521, 722 P.2d 1353, 1355 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (search of envelope); State
v. Cline, 126 N.M. 77, 78, 966 P.2d 785, 786 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998) (search of zippered cosmetics
pouch).
65.

See generally HUBBART, supra note 31, at 340–46.

66.

See generally id.
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digital world, this distinction makes sense. A container is “an object (such as a box or can) that can hold something.”67 Courts have
conclusively decided “that a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a container that he or she owns or possesses.”68
As discussed in prior cases analyzing searches under the
Fourth Amendment, “the opening of any closed containers . . . constitutes a separate search.”69 Traditionally, it has been very easy
to determine when privacy in a physical container has been violated: if the container has been opened, with its contents laid bare
for the world to see, the expectation of privacy in that container
has been violated.70 It is not until the container is opened that the
person loses his or her expectation of privacy.71
To illustrate the physical container distinction under the private search doctrine, let’s assume the private searcher comes
across a metal box with a lid, opens that box, and discovers marijuana and drug paraphernalia, stacks of cash, various clothing
items and a notebook containing a ledger of accounts. When the
private searcher lifts the lid on the metal box, any expectation of
privacy the owner possessed in that box has been extinguished.
This is because simply by lifting the lid and viewing the contents
of the box, it becomes clear what the box contains. The government
agent can proceed to search the box with a virtual certainty of what
the box will contain. The government agent knows the box will contain marijuana, drug paraphernalia, money, clothes, and a notebook, simply because that is what the private searcher informed
the government agent the box would contain.
The government agent’s search of the metal box does not violate the Fourth Amendment because the private searcher has already extinguished any expectation of privacy existing in the box
and therefore, any subsequent search is not a “search” for purposes

67. Container, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2015), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/container.
68.

HUBBART, supra note 31, at 341.

69. Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531,
554 (citing United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535, 541 (4th Cir. 1978)).
70.

See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984).

71.

See id.
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of the Fourth Amendment.72 The reason the subsequent search is
not a Fourth Amendment “search” turns on the reasoning in Jacobsen regarding the virtual certainty requirement. The physical
container distinction works well for smaller containers, such as the
metal box in the example above, because by opening the container,
the private searcher and the subsequent government searcher
know the contents of the container with virtual, if not absolute,
certainty. However, as will be discussed in Part VI, infra, the physical container distinction does not apply well to larger spaces such
as a shipping container or a house.73 This has prompted the courts
to apply limitations to the private search doctrine in those instances.
These limitations arguably should be applied to digital devices
as well because the virtual certainty requirement cannot possibly
be satisfied as applied to a digital container. It is not automatically
obvious upon opening the device, what the device will contain.
Therefore, the physical container distinction is inappropriate as
applied to digital containers. The question then becomes what is
the appropriate test in determining permissible scope of searching
digital devices. Orin S. Kerr sought to create a workable standard
for searching digital devices, and so created the three zone theories.74 The rest of this section discusses the zone theories highlighted by Kerr.

B. Application of the Container Distinction to Digital Devices:
The Zone Theories
As discussed above, the container theory comports well when
the property at issue is a physical, discrete receptacle; however,

72.

See id.

73.

See infra Part VI.

74.

Kerr, supra note 17, at 554.
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the container theory diverges in the digital world where the containers are not discrete objects but imaginary data.
Orin S. Kerr explains this deviation well in his article entitled
Searches and Seizures in a Digital World.75 Kerr suggests that applying traditional principles of searches in the physical world to
the digital world can occur in accordance with three different options: (1) the zone of the initial search could be the physical storage
device itself, (2) the zone of the initial search “could be defined by
the contents of a virtual file,” or (3) the zone of the initial search
could be the exposed data.76 Each of these individual search zones
has singular implications on the scope of what a government agent
is allowed to search following an initial private search under the
private search doctrine. The zones will now be outlined in the order
listed above.
1. The Zone is the Physical Storage Device.
The term physical storage device is somewhat confusing. It refers to a tangible storage device which stores digital data. This type
of device includes, but is not limited to, computers, cell phones,
SIM cards, flash drives, “floppy” disks, hard drives, and CDs. The
device itself is tangible, but the data it contains is intangible.
Under the “zone is the device” theory, the digital search is not
limited to files, folders, or exposed data.77 The physical storage device is the container, and the search of any information stored upon
the device is permissible so long as the device itself has already
been opened.78 For purposes of the private search doctrine this
means if the private actor simply opened the device, even if he or
she only viewed a single unit of data on the device, any subsequent
search of the device’s entire data does not constitute an impermissible search under the Fourth Amendment.79 If the physical storage device is a computer, all the private searcher need do is open

75.

Id.

76.

Id.

77.

See id. at 554–55.

78.

See id. at 555 (citing United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 452–53 (5th Cir.

79.

See id.

2001)).
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and turn on the computer and view any file on the device.80 If the
physical storage device is a SIM card, flash drive, “floppy disk,”
hard drive, or CD, all the private searcher need do is insert that
device into a computer (or other instrument capable of reading the
contents of the storage device), open it so that its contents are capable of being viewed, and view a single unit of data on the device.81
If the search zone is defined as the device itself, opening the
device and accessing just one file means the private searcher has
searched the entire contents of the device and frustrated any privacy expectation of the device itself.82 This means any subsequent
searches, even if not of the specific images or files originally
searched by the private actor, do not exceed the scope of the private
search doctrine.83 This zone definition is clearly the most permissive of the three. The next most permissive zone definition is the
“zone is the virtual folder” distinction.
2. The Zone is the Virtual File
Under the “zone is the virtual file” distinction, the digital
search is limited to a virtual file, and only that virtual file.84 This
file could be a document, image, or PDF for example. The file is the
container for all intents and purposes. Opening the file means you
have frustrated any expectation of privacy that existed within the
file.85
A good example of the virtual file approach exists in United
States v. Lichtenberger. As will be discussed infra, Lichtenberger

80.

See Kerr, supra note 17, at 555.

81.

See id.

82.

See id.

83.

See id.

84.

See id. at 554–55.

85.

See id.
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involved a private search of the suspect’s computer, which was determined to contain images of child pornography.86 Although the
private searcher, in this case the suspect’s girlfriend, viewed images of child pornography on the device, upon turning the device
over to law enforcement, the girlfriend was unable to say with certainty that the specific images she showed to the law enforcement
agent were the same images she viewed during her private
search.87 As a result, the Sixth Circuit determined the subsequent
government search exceeded the scope of the private search.88 The
court reasoned the agent’s viewing of additional files than those
viewed during the private search was an impermissible extension
of the private search because the suspect retained an expectation
of privacy in the images not searched by the girlfriend.89 In so holding, the court created precedent for later courts to apply the “zone
is the virtual file” distinction.
The “zone is the virtual file” distinction is more restrictive
than the “zone is the digital device” approach because it does not
allow the government agent to search the entire device; rather, this
approach limits the government agent to only searching the specific images or files already viewed by the private searcher.90 The
virtual file distinction is, however, less restrictive than the “zone
is the exposed data” approach because it allows the government
agent to search the entire file or image and does not require the
agent to limit his search to only the data shown on the output
screen.91
3. The Zone is the Exposed Data
The last zone theory is the most restrictive of the three, and
has not been adopted in any court to date. The “zone is the exposed
data” theory limits the scope of the search to the information appearing on the output device (computer screen, cell phone screen,

86.

86 F.3d 478, 480–81 (6th Cir. 2015).

87.

Id. at 481.

88.

Id. at 485.

89.

Id.

90.

See Kerr, supra note 17, at 554–56.

91.

See id. at 555–57.
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printer, etc.).92 The exposed data could be an individual image, an
individual document, or even smaller subsets of these items such
as a single page or part of a page within a document.93 The officers
conducting the subsequent search of the device are limited to viewing specifically what the private searcher viewed down to the minute details of the data.94
For example, if Sally views a document on Jeff’s computer that
she believes contains evidence of Jeff’s fraudulent business transactions, but Sally only views the first page of that document before
handing the computer in to the FBI, the FBI agents investigating
her tip are limited to viewing only the first page of the document
Sally opened. These agents may not view any other page in this
document, nor can they view any other image, document, file, or
folder stored on the device itself. Under the “zone is the exposed
data” approach, even scrolling down to see a different part of the
same word processing file searched by the private actor constitutes
a separate search under the Fourth Amendment, and if the officers
did not first obtain a search warrant to do so, the search is in violation of the device owner’s Fourth Amendment rights.95
The “zone is the virtual file” approach does not require this
limitation and permits the agent to search the entire document.
The “zone is the virtual file” approach, therefore, is a happy medium between the three approaches outlined by Orin S. Kerr. As
will be discussed infra, the virtual file approach is the approach
that should be adopted in every private search doctrine case involving searches of digital containers. This approach adequately
balances the competing policy interests at stake and ensures the
unwavering protection of Fourth Amendment rights.

92.

Id. at 556–57.

93.

Id.

94.

Id.

95.

Id. at 557.
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Although Kerr, the creator of the zone approaches, advocates
for the exposed data approach,96 no court to date has adopted such
a restrictive distinction. The courts that have addressed this issue
are instead in contention over the first two approaches: the digital
device approach and the virtual file approach.97 The next section of
this comment will discuss the differing opinions regarding the
proper approach to take in limiting the government search, specifically discussing the major cases on each side of the divide.
IV. APPLYING THE CONTAINER DISTINCTION IN THE
DIGITAL WORLD: EXPLAINING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
As mentioned above, the various United States Circuit Courts
of Appeals are split on the issue of limiting the scope of the subsequent government search following the initial private search.98 The
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Seventh
Circuits hold with the “zone is the device” theory and define the
container as the physical storage device itself.99 For these two circuits, as long as the subsequent governmental search is confined
to only the digital devices already opened by the private searcher,
the governmental search is permissible.100
The United States Circuit Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and
Eleventh Circuits, on the other hand, hold with a theory limiting
the search to the virtual file.101 The United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit arguably aligns with this approach

96. Kerr, supra note 17, at 556 (“the better answer is to use the exposed information
as the common denominator. The scope of a computer search should be whatever information
appears on the output device . . .”).
97. United States v. Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323, 1330 (11th Cir. 2015) (cell phone); United
States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 479 (6th Cir. 2015) (computer); United States v. Tosti,
733 F.3d 816, 818 (9th Cir. 2013) (computer); Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832, 833 (7th Cir.
2012) (ZIP drive and camera memory card); United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 452 (5th
Cir. 2001) (ZIP disks).
98. See Sparks, 806 F.3d at 1330; Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 479; Tosti, 733 F.3d at
818; Rann, 689 F.3d at 833; Runyan, 275 F.3d at 452.
99.

See Runyan, 275 F.3d at 452; Rann, 689 F.3d at 837.

100.

See Runyan, 275 F.3d at 452; Rann, 689 F.3d at 837.

101.

See Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 488; Sparks, 806 F.3d at 1336.

2017

IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRIVATE SEARCH DOCTRINE IN
A DIGITAL AGE: ADVOCATING FOR LIMITATIONS ON
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES THROUGH ADOPTION OF
THE VIRTUAL FILE APPROACH

797

as well, as discussed in dicta in United States v. Tosti.102 These circuits hold that the permissible container is the individual image,
document, file, etc.103 Within this restriction, the government agent
is allowed to open and view the document, image, or file already
seen by the private searcher, but is not allowed to open or view any
other document, image, or file not already seen.104 These circuits
adopt a middle-ground approach to defining the scope and adequately balance the competing interests of furthering governmental investigation and protecting the privacy interests of citizens. As
will become clear infra, this approach is the correct approach.
The leading cases holding for the “zone is the virtual file” approach are United States v. Lichtenberger and United States v.
Sparks, and through dicta, United States v. Tosti. The leading
cases holding for the “zone is the digital device” approach are
United States v. Runyan, and Rann v. Atchison. The latter cases
will be discussed first.
A. The View of the Fifth and Seventh Circuits: The Container
Should be the Physical Storage Device
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits hold in favor of limiting the
scope of the government search, following the private search, to the
physical storage device itself.105 This means that if the private
searcher views even one image or file on the digital storage device,
the device owner’s privacy interest in that device is frustrated.106
Therefore, any subsequent search of the device does not exceed the
scope of the private search, even if the subsequent search views
additional, unviewed files and images.107 The first case to hold in
favor of this approach was United States v. Runyan, a 2001 case

102.

See Tosti, 733 F.3d at 822.

103.

See Runyan, 275 F.3d at 452; Rann, 689 F.3d at 837.

104.

See Runyan, 275 F.3d at 452; Rann, 689 F.3d at 837.

105.

Runyan, 275 F.3d at 452; Rann, 689 F.3d at 833.

106.

See Runyan, 275 F.3d at 452; Rann, 689 F.3d at 833.

107.

See Runyan, 275 F.3d at 452; Rann, 689 F.3d at 833.
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published long before the Supreme Court addressed the unique privacy interests at stake in digital devices in Riley v. California.108
1. United States v. Runyan
United States v. Runyan established the “zone is the digital
device” approach.109 The situation giving rise to the Fifth Circuit’s
adoption of this approach was as follows: the defendant’s ex-wife
confiscated a desktop computer and several floppy disks, ZIP disks,
and CDS.110 After discovering that these devices contained images
of child pornography, she turned the evidence over to the police.111
The ex-wife only viewed some of the floppy disks and CDS, but did
not view any of the ZIP disks.112 Law enforcement agents “examined several images from each disk and CD, including the ZIP
disks.”113 Based on the results of this investigation “Runyan was
indicted on six counts of child pornography charges.”114
Following his arrest, Runyan moved to suppress all of the evidence obtained against him, arguing that the warrantless searches
of the disks were conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment
and therefore, any evidence obtained through these illegal
searches had to be suppressed.115 Runyan argued the government
search exceeded the private search because state and federal officials examined the ZIP disks, even though Runyan’s ex-wife had
not.116 He also argued that agents “examined more images in reviewing each of these disks than did the private searchers.”117

108.

Runyan, 275 F.3d at 452.

109.

See id.

110.

Id. at 453.

111.

Id.

112.

Id.

113.

Id. at 454

114.

Runyan, 275 F.3d at 455.

115.

Id.

116.

Id. at 460.

117.

Id.
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The issue before the Fifth Circuit was whether a police search
exceeds the scope of the private search when the police examine
more items within a particular container than did the private
searchers.118 In answering this question, the Fifth Circuit highlighted key language in United States v. Jacobsen — “the critical
inquiry under the Fourth Amendment is whether the authorities
obtained information with respect to which the defendant’s expectation of privacy has not already been frustrated.”119 The Court relied on the reasoning in Jacobsen which concluded that a police
search is not problematic under the Fourth Amendment if the police “actions ‘enabled . . . [them] to learn nothing that had not previously been learned during the private search.’”120 The police had
to be substantially certain of what the container would hold.121 The
police could become substantially certain of the container’s contents “based on the statements of the private searchers, their replication of the private search, and their expertise.”122 Based on this
reasoning, the Fifth Circuit determined that the police search did,
in fact, exceed the scope of the private search because the defendant’s ex-wife did not search the ZIP disks at all.123 Runyan’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the ZIP disks, therefore, still existed.124
The pertinent part of Runyan, for purposes of investigating
the digital container distinction, concerns the second argument
given by the defendant — that the government search exceeded the
scope of the private search doctrine because the police “examined

118.

Id. at 456.

119.

Id. at 461.

120.
(1984)).

Runyan, 275 F.3d at 463 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 446 U.S. 109, 120

121.

Id.

122.

Id.

123. Id. at 464 (“Indeed, [Judith] could not have known the contents of any of the ZIP
disks, as she and Brandie did not use hardware capable of reading these disks in their private
search.”).
124.

Id.
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more files on each of the disks than did the private searchers.”125
In response, the Fifth Circuit held that there was no constitutional
issue when police examined more files than did the private
searcher.126 The Fifth Circuit followed precedent established by
United States v. Simpson127 which held law enforcement agents “do
not exceed the scope of a prior private search when they examine
the same materials that were examined by the private searchers,
but they examine these materials more thoroughly than did the
private parties.”128 The reason for this exception is the simple fact
that the individual’s expectation of privacy in his property has already been frustrated by the private searcher; therefore, any subsequent viewing of the container’s contents by the police does not
constitute a “new ‘search’ for Fourth Amendment purposes.”129
In essence, although not explicitly stated, the Runyan court
viewed the “container,” for purposes of the private search doctrine,
as the physical storage device itself, in this case CDs and a computer.130 Once the defendant’s privacy interest has been frustrated
in the container, anything on the device is fair game for police investigation and can be used as evidence to obtain a warrant or to
arrest the defendant.131
The Fifth Circuit identified the following policy reasons for its
liberal definition of “container.” Using a “zone is the exposed data”
or “zone is the file” approach would prevent the police from “engaging in lawful investigation of containers where any reasonable expectation of privacy has already been eroded.”132 This would be a
waste of time and resources.133 Also, police would waste time and
resources attempting to obtain warrants based on the testimony of

125.

Id.

126.

Runyan, 275 F.3d at 465.

127.

United States v. Simpson, 904 F.2d 607, 610 (11th Cir. 1990).

128.

Runyan, 275 F.3d at 464 (citing Simpson, 904 F.2d at 610).

129.

Id. at 465.

130.

See id. at 463–65.

131.

See id.

132.

Id. at 465.

133.

Id.
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private searchers, which may or may not be reliable.134 An approach that does not allow the police to search the whole container
following the private searcher’s opening of that container might:
. . . lead police to waste valuable time and resources obtaining warrants based on intentionally false or misleading testimony of private searchers, for fear that, in confirming the
private testimony before obtaining a warrant, they would
inadvertently violate the Fourth Amendment if they happened upon additional contraband that the private searchers did not see.135
The key takeaway from the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in
Runyan is, for the sake of judicial expediency and conservation of
law enforcement resources, police should be able to examine containers already searched by private individuals, even to a greater
degree and intensity than previously executed.136 After all, the
property owner’s expectation of privacy has already been frustrated anyway.137 Government agents do not exceed the scope of
the private search when they view additional files on a device that
has already been searched by the private individual, but they do
exceed the scope of the private search if they view additional devices not viewed by the private individual prior to the government
search.138 This train of reasoning can also be found in a 7th Circuit
case, Rann v. Atchison.139
2. Rann v. Atchison
Rann v. Atchison is the most recent case holding in favor of the
“zone is the digital device” approach. The Seventh Circuit was

134.

Runyan, 275 F.3d at 465.

135.

Id.

136.

See id.

137.

Id.

138.

Id.

139.

Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832, 833 (7th Cir. 2012).
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called upon to decide if the police’s viewing of images not viewed
by the private searcher was a “significant expansion of a private
search such that a warrant was required to permit police to view
the images.”140 The court ultimately concluded, following the Fifth
Circuit’s reasoning in Runyan, the government search did not exceed the private search.141
Steven Rann was convicted, in November 2006, of criminal
sexual assault and possession of child pornography.142 Rann’s
daughter reported him for sexual assault and turned in to the police, a digital camera memory card and a computer zip drive.143
Rann argued that when police searched the submitted devices and
viewed images stored upon them, they exceeded the scope of any
private search previously conducted by the private party.144 Rann
based this argument on the fact that no evidence was submitted
showing that the private party had previously viewed the devices,
nor that she “knew the digital storage devices contained images of
child pornography prior to the police viewing.”145 Without this certainty, Rann contended, “police needed a warrant to ‘open’ the digital storage devices and search them . . ..”146 Without a warrant,
the police search violated Rann’s Fourth Amendment rights and
any evidence obtained through the illegal search should be suppressed.147
Citing Jacobsen and Runyan, the court in Rann held police did
not exceed the scope of the private search when they searched the
disks.148 The officers in charge of this case could have been substantially certain, based on statements made by the private

140.

Id. at 835.

141.

Id. at 838.

142.

Id. at 833.

143.

Id. at 834.

144.

Id. at 836.

145.

Rann, 689 F.3d at 836.

146.

Id.

147.

Id.

148.

Id. at 837.
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searcher, what the disks contained.149 Additionally, the Rann court
commented that “even if the police more thoroughly searched the
digital media devices . . . the police search did not exceed or expand
the scope of the initial private searches.”150 Once it could be determined that the reasonable expectation of privacy in the devices was
frustrated by the private party, any evidence contained within the
device was fair game for investigation.151
Again, the Rann court viewed the “zone is the device” theory
as the sensible approach when determining what it means to exceed the scope of the private search because the approach allegedly
“preserves the competing objectives underlying the Fourth Amendment’s protections against warrantless police searches.”152 The
“zone is the device” theory keeps intact the defendant’s reasonably
legitimate expectation of privacy until such time as that expectation of privacy is frustrated by the private search.153 When the frustration occurs, the additional invasions of privacy are still tested
in regards to the degree by which they exceed the scope of the private search.154 However, the “zone is the device” theory also proceeds from the assumption that warrants are costly and time consuming for police to obtain.155 If the police are reasonably certain
of what information the device will contain, based on the private
search and their own expertise, and the suspect’s privacy has already been violated, what is the harm in viewing additional files?156
As will be discussed in Part VI, infra, the reasoning supporting
the Rann court’s decision to support the “zone is the digital device”
approach is flawed.157 Warrants are not that costly and they are
149.

Id.

150.

Id. at 838.

151.

See Rann, 689 F.3d at 838.

152.

Id. at 837.

153.

Id.

154.

Id.

155.

See United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 465 (5th Cir. 2001).

156.

See id.

157.

See infra Part VI.
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much easier to obtain in the digital age. Additionally, the unique
characteristics of digital devices, specifically the immense storage
capabilities and the discrete types of information contained on
these devices, requires a much more restrictive approach to defining the permissible scope of the government search. This restrictive approach can be seen in the post-Riley cases of United States
v. Lichtenberger and United States v. Sparks in the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, respectively, and the pre-Riley case of United States
v. Tosti in the Ninth Circuit. The next section of this comment will
discuss these cases in depth.
B. The View of the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits: The
Container Should be the Virtual File
The position of the Fifth and Seventh Circuits described above
is flatly rejected by the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals for
the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits.158 These courts believe the “zone
is the device” theory exposes criminal defendants to too much arbitrary governmental intrusion.159 Instead, these circuits believe
the proper theory defining the scope of the private search should
be the “zone is the virtual file” approach.160 The first circuit to hold
in favor of the “zone is the virtual file” approach was the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Lichtenberger.161
1. United States v. Lichtenberger
In United States v. Lichtenberger, the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided against the persuasive trend set by the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, holding that individual files and images are separate “containers” and therefore, a
subsequent government search of a digital storage device is limited
to the individual files and images viewed by the private searcher.162
Authorities arrested Aron Lichtenberger after his girlfriend discovered images of child pornography on his laptop and showed

158. See United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 479 (6th Cir. 2015); United
States v. Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323, 1333 (11th Cir. 2015).
159.

See Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 479; Sparks, 806 F.3d at 1333.

160.

See Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 479; Sparks, 806 F.3d at 1333.

161.

Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 485.

162.

Id. at 490–91.
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some of the images to the police.163 Lichtenberger was charged with
possession of child pornography; “before trial, Lichtenberger filed
a motion to suppress the laptop evidence, which the district court
granted.”164
The district court granted Lichtenberger’s motion to suppress
based on testimony from his girlfriend in which she admitted to
viewing “approximately 100 images of child pornography saved in
several subfolders inside a folder entitled ‘private.’”165 Lichtenberger’s girlfriend could not identify which photographs she eventually presented to authorities, and could not say with certainty
whether the images she presented to authorities were the exact
images she viewed during her private search of Lichtenberger’s
computer.166 The district court ruled authorities exceeded the scope
of the private search because they viewed additional images not
already seen through the private search.167 The Sixth Circuit rejected the government’s appeal.168
Relying on United States v. Jacobsen, the court determined
that a government actor exceeds the scope of the private search
when he or she frustrates an expectation of privacy within the
property that had not already been frustrated by the private actor.169 Pronouncing a largely political argument for its decision, the
Sixth Circuit held the scope of the authorities’ “search of Lichtenberger’s laptop exceeded that of Holmes’ private search conducted

163.

Id. at 479.

164.

Id. at 480.

165.

Id. at 481.

166.

Id.

167.

See Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 481.

168.

Id.

169. Id. at 485 (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 446 U.S. 109, 117–18 (1984)) (“The
Fourth Amendment is implicated only if the authorities use information with respect to which
the expectation of privacy has not already been frustrated. In such a case the authorities have
not relied on what is in effect a private search, and therefore presumptively violate the Fourth
Amendment if they act without a warrant.”).
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earlier that day.”170 The court discussed what it termed the “critical
measures” under the private search doctrine in regards to the
scope of a permissible government search.171 These “critical
measures” were: (1) how much information authorities were exposed to upon re-examination of the device and (2) the certainty of
the authorities regarding what they would likely find upon the device.172
Adopting reasoning from the Supreme Court’s recent decision
in Riley v. California, the court determined it would be inappropriate to rely upon the traditional principles regarding searches of
physical spaces and the items they contained in the context of digital spaces.173 The Sixth Circuit’s main reasoning for breaking from
tradition was due to the immense storage capacity of modern digital devices.174 As the court noted, “the likelihood that an electronic
device will contain 1) many kinds of data, 2) in vast amounts, and
3) corresponding to a long swath of time, convinced the Riley court
that officers must obtain a warrant before searching such a device
incident to arrest.”175 That reasoning, in the eyes of the Sixth Circuit, applied just as convincingly to the private search doctrine as
it did to the search incident to arrest exception.176
The privacy interest in Lichtenberger’s property greatly outweighed any governmental interest in conducting the search.177
The fundamental reason for this tip in the balance came down to
virtual certainty, or lack thereof.178 As required by Jacobsen, in order to stay within the scope of the private search, local authorities
have to proceed with virtual certainty that they would not learn

170.

Id. at 485.

171.

Id.

172.

Id. at 485–86.

173.

Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 487.

174.

Id.

175.

Id. at 488 (citing Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014)).

176.

Id. at 488.

177.

Id.
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Id.
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any new, private information from their subsequent search.179 Virtual certainty is an impossibility with digital devices due to their
unique capabilities.180
As the court discussed, the government’s search of Lichtenberger’s laptop could have revealed staggering amounts of Lichtenberger’s private information “unrelated to the allegations prompting the search.”181 For example, the folders containing the images
of child pornography just as easily could have contained “explicit
photos of Lichtenberger himself,” “bank statements or personal
communications,” “Lichtenberger’s medical history,” or even “his
choice of restaurant.”182 These potential intrusions into Lichtenberger’s private life could not possibly be justified, especially considering the governmental search lacked any of the “risks that support an immediate search.”183 The authorities’ safety was not
threatened, Lichtenberger had already been arrested so “the images were not in danger of erasure, deterioration, or tampering,”
and “the need to confirm the laptop’s contents on-site was not immediate.”184 Due to “the strong privacy interests at stake, and the
absence of threat to government interests,” the Sixth Circuit concluded that the authorities’ search of Lichtenberger’s laptop did, in
fact, violate Lichtenberger’s Fourth Amendment rights against
warrantless searches.185 In doing so, the Sixth Circuit established
conclusively that a government search which follows a private

179.

Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 488.

180.

See id. at 488–89.

181.

Id. at 489.

182.

Id.

183.

Id. at 491.

184.

Id.

185.
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search exceeds the scope of the private search when the government searcher views additional files or images not viewed by the
private actor.186
In reaching its conclusion, the Sixth Circuit relied in part on
reasoning established by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Tosti.187
2. United States v. Tosti
Although United States v. Tosti did not conclusively decide
that the “zone is the virtual file” approach is the correct approach
when determining permissible scope, the court in this case did,
through dicta, give the impression that it determined the proper
approach is the virtual file approach.188 The police arrested the defendant, Donald Thomas Tosti, after a computer technician at a
CompUSA store discovered child pornography in a sub-folder on
Tosti’s computer.189 At trial, Tosti moved to suppress the evidence
obtained through the government’s search of his computer at the
CompUSA store,190 arguing the search exceeded the scope of the
private search because detectives viewed enlarged photographs in
a slideshow format and scrolled through the thumbnail images,
whereas the computer technician who conducted the initial search
only viewed the thumbnail versions of the photos.191 The district
court and the Ninth Circuit agreed that Tosti was not entitled to
suppression on either of these bases.192
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that pursuant to Jacobsen precedent, the government search does not constitute a “search” for
Fourth Amendment purposes if the reasonable expectation of privacy in the property has already been extinguished by a private
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United States v. Tosti, 733 F.3d 816, 821 (9th Cir. 2013).
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party.193 Scrolling through thumbnail photographs, which have already been exposed in their thumbnail form to a private actor, and
enlarging those photographs does not constitute an additional invasion of privacy.194 Even though he only viewed the photos in
thumbnail form, the computer technician extinguished any reasonable expectation of privacy Tosti had in the images.195
Central to our discussion on the permissible scope of subsequent government searches of digital storage devices is the Ninth
Circuit’s reasoning in relation to what the government agents did
not do when they searched Tosti’s computer. As the court noted in
Tosti, detectives did not view photos not already seen by the computer technician.196 Likewise, “there was ‘no evidence in the record
to suggest that either [d]etective . . . viewed any file folder or images other than the file folder and images opened by [the technician].” 197 This explicit statement by the court in support of its finding that the detectives did not exceed the scope of the private
search in this case seems to indicate that had the detectives viewed
additional files on the device, the government search would have
exceeded the private search. Additional support for this analysis
comes from the fact that the Sixth Circuit, in deciding United
States v. Lichtenberger, supported its decision by reference to the
reasoning pronounced above by the Ninth Circuit in Tosti.198
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that on the issue of permissible scope in warrantless searches of digital storage devices, the
Ninth Circuit holds in favor of the virtual file theory.
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The most recent decision weighing on this issue at the circuit
court level is United States v. Sparks,199 an Eleventh Circuit case
decided December 1, 2015.200
3. United States v. Sparks
United States v. Sparks tasked the Eleventh Circuit with deciding what was a permissible warrantless search of a cell phone
under the private search doctrine.201 Similar to the cases coming
before it, United States v. Sparks was an appeal from convictions
for possession and production of child pornography.202 Defendants
Alan Robert Johnson and Jennifer A. Sparks left a cell phone containing hundreds of images and videos of child pornography at a
Walmart in Cape Coral, Florida.203 A Walmart employee showed
the images on the cell phone to her husband, Widner, who brought
the phone to the local authorities.204 Upon searching the phone, the
local authorities viewed several images and two videos, one which
was previously watched by Widner and one that had not been
viewed during the private search.205
Johnson and Sparks argued, in their respective motions to
suppress, that the authorities’s viewing of the second unwatched
video constituted an expansion of Widner’s private search; and
therefore, a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights against
unreasonable governmental search and seizure.206 The Eleventh
Circuit agreed on this point.207 The court expressed “serious doubts
that approving of the viewing of the second video when no private
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party had first watched it would be consistent with the reasoning
in Riley v. California.”208
In light of the privacy concerns unique to digital devices, Widner’s private search of the cell phone could not possibly have extinguished all reasonable expectation of privacy in the device itself.209
The court stated:
While Widner’s private search of the cell phone might have
removed certain information from the Fourth Amendment’s
protections, it did not expose every part of the information
contained in the cell phone. Here, no search warrant was
obtained, and no exception to the search-warrant requirement excused [the detective’s] viewing of the second
video.210
Hence, the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Sparks, further strengthened the support for a determination of permissible
scope based on the actual images and files viewed by the private
actor.211 In doing so, the court relied significantly on the reasoning
espoused in Riley v. California.212 The Supreme Court’s reasoning
in Riley lays the foundation for limiting searches of digital devices.
The next part of this article discusses the Riley decision, highlighting Chief Justice Roberts’s analysis regarding the unique peculiarities of digital devices and the importance of protecting personal
privacy.
V. THE LEGACY OF RILEY V. CALIFORNIA: ADVOCATING
FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT INTRUSION ON PERSONAL
PRIVACY RIGHTS IN DIGITAL DEVICES
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Riley v. California was not a case involving the private search
doctrine; rather, it dealt with the application of the Fourth Amendment to digital devices through the search-incident-to-arrest exception.213 Despite the fact that Riley concerned a different Fourth
Amendment exception, the policy reasoning encouraging digital
device search limitations and the Court’s discussion of the privacy
interests at stake informs our current issue. For that reason, this
section will give an overview of the discussion in Riley, highlighting specific points discussed by Chief Justice Roberts concerning
the proliferation and unique attributes of digital devices and the
importance of limiting warrantless access to these devices.
The search-incident-to-arrest exception essentially allows “the
Government . . . to search the person of the accused when legally
arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crimes.”214
This exception is certainly different from the private search doctrine because it involves actions initiated by government agents,
not private individuals, and it exists primarily to recognize “concerns for officer safety and evidence preservation.”215 However, the
two exceptions are similar in that they concern the reasonableness
of warrantless searches. It is the reasonableness point that was at
issue in Riley216 and that is at issue in our discussion of private
search doctrine cases. Therefore, the Court’s reasoning in Riley is
informative of how the Court likely would and should define the
scope of a permissible subsequent search of a digital device by a
government agent in private search doctrine cases.
Chief Justice Roberts began by examining the singular characteristics of modern digital devices (particularly cellular “smart”
phones).217 In the words of Chief Justice Roberts, “modern cell
phones . . . are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life
that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an
important feature of human anatomy.”218 Roberts noted that even
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less sophisticated phones, which are increasingly becoming obsolete, are “based on technology nearly inconceivable just a few decades ago.”219 Denouncing the United States’s argument “that a
search of all data stored on a cell phone is ‘materially indistinguishable’ from searches of these sorts of physical items.” Roberts
pronounced that modern devices, as a whole, “implicate privacy
concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of [a physical
container].”220
Cell phones contain immense storage capacity.221 The standard model of the top-selling smart phone, at the time of the Riley
decision, was sixteen (16) gigabytes.222 “Sixteen gigabytes translates to millions of pages of text, thousands of pictures, or hundreds
of videos.”223 Additionally, cell phones have the capability of storing
many distinct types of information, such as “photographs, picture
messages, text messages, internet browsing history, a calendar, a
thousand-entry phone book, and so on.”224
Chief Justice Roberts highlighted four interrelated consequences on personal privacy as a result of the increasing storage
capacity of cell phones (as well as other digital devices).225 First, a
cell phone is a repository for numerous distinct forms of information, including but not limited to notes, addresses, prescriptions, videos, and bank or credit statements, which may “reveal
much more in combination than any isolated record.”226 Second:
A cell phone’s capacity allows even just one type of information to convey far more than previously possible. The
219.
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sum of an individual’s private life can be reconstructed
through a thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions; the same cannot be said of a photograph or two of loved ones tucked into a wallet.227
Third, unless the device’s owner sets the device to automatically delete information after a certain period of time, devices accumulate unending stores of information, which “can date back to
the purchase of the [device], or even earlier.”228 It is not uncommon
for individuals to retain the same device for years at a time before
upgrading to a new model, which means that a person’s communication with people in his life can be recorded and stored for weeks,
months, or years.229 In contrast, a person is very unlikely to record
all the face-to-face conversations he has with others and take those
communications with him wherever he goes.230 Finally, cell phone
use is exceedingly pervasive.231 “Prior to the digital age, people did
not typically carry a cache of sensitive personal information with
them as they went about their day.”232 “Now it is the person who is
not carrying a cell phone, with all that it contains, who is the exception.”233 Roberts highlighted a further complication on the scope
of the privacy interests at stake by noting the existence of cloud
computing, “the capacity of Internet-connected devices to display
data stored on remote servers rather than on the device itself.”234
The existence of cloud computing creates the issue that the government agent’s search is not limited to just what is on the device.235
The above policy implications convinced the Supreme Court to
significantly limit warrantless searches of digital devices, even if
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conducted through a legitimate exception to the Fourth Amendment.236 Chief Justice Roberts concluded his opinion with the recognition that the Court’s decision would have a great “impact on the
ability of law enforcement to combat crime.”237 Roberts recognized
that cell phones (and other digital devices) “have become important
tools in facilitating coordination and communication among members of criminal enterprises, and can provide valuable incriminating information about dangerous criminals.”238 Roberts noted, however, that “[p]rivacy comes at a cost,”239 and if the police want to
search the digital device, they can, but first, they must obtain a
warrant.240
The conclusion that police should be able to search an entire
digital device following the private search is quite clearly at odds
with the Supreme Court’s current view of privacy rights in digital
devices. As the following section will make clear, it is the virtual
file approach, not the digital device approach, that preserves the
privacy protections our Founders fought so hard to obtain, and for
that reason, it is the correct approach for all courts in this nation
to adopt.
VI. WHY LIMITING THE SCOPE OF THE PERMISSIBLE
GOVERNMENTAL SEARCH TO THE INDIVIDUAL IMAGE OR
FILE IS THE CORRECT APPROACH: ANALYZING THE
POLICY INTERESTS AT STAKE
As Lichtenberger, Tosti, and Sparks make clear, applying the
traditional test for determining what it means to exceed the scope
of a private search, as applied to physical, tangible containers, is
inappropriate for outlining a permissible search of a digital container. Digital containers differ from physical containers in
marked ways. This point was evidenced in the Supreme Court’s
decision in Riley v. California, discussed in the previous section.
Although the government has expressed some important policy
236.
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reasons, such as the danger of evidence destruction and the considerable resources expended to obtain search warrants, these reasons are substantially outweighed by: (1) the intent of the Founding Fathers and the ratifying generation in passing the Fourth
Amendment, (2) the nature and pervasive use of digital devices
themselves, and (3) the impossibility of virtual certainty regarding
the contents of digital containers. This section will consider the
main arguments posed by the Fifth and Seventh Circuits in support of the digital device approach and explain why these arguments are flawed. Then, this section will discuss the main arguments in favor of the virtual file approach, and ultimately conclude
that these arguments prevail.
A. The Arguments for Adopting the Digital Device Approach &
Why Such a Permissive Approach is Unwarranted
As outlined above, the primary reasons extended by the Fifth
Circuit in United States v. Runyan to support it’s holding in favor
of the “zone is the digital device” approach included the unnecessary and significant judicial costs in obtaining warrants and the
fact that the government agent could already be virtually certain
of what the device contained due to the description of the contents
by the private searcher.241 Another argument that could arguably
be extended in favor of adopting the “zone is the digital device” approach is to prevent destruction of evidence through modern data
destruction techniques. These arguments will be discussed in this
section, and ultimately rejected.
1. Preventing Destruction of Evidence
One argument that could be extended in support of allowing
the government agent to search the entire digital device, even if
the private searcher did not do so, is the danger that, through modern data destruction technologies, the pertinent evidence of criminal activity might be deleted from the device prior to the government agent’s being able to obtain a warrant. This is a potential
problem because in many of the cases involving the private search
doctrine, the private searcher personally knows the owner of the
property.242 The personal relationship between the private
241.

See supra Part IV.A.1.

242. United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 452 (5th Cir. 2001) (private searcher was
the defendant’s ex-wife); United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 480 (6th Cir. 2015)
(private searcher was defendant’s girlfriend); Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832, 834 (7th Cir.
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searcher and the alleged criminal/owner of the property can have
problematic consequences on the government’s search of the property. If the private searcher tips off the suspect, even unintentionally, as to the government confiscation of property, prior to the government agent being able to obtain a warrant to search the rest of
the device, the suspect could wipe the device or encrypt it so the
data cannot be accessed.243 This is a process known as remote wiping.244
Remote wiping is “a security feature that allows a network administrator or device owner to send a command to a computing device and delete data.”245 If a computer or other device is connected
to the Internet and the device’s owner is sophisticated enough in
computer technology, the owner could remotely access the computer with the object of removing any incriminating data upon the
device before that data could be used against the owner.246 “A remote wipe may delete data in selected folders, repeatedly overwrite
stored data to prevent forensic recovery, return the device to factory settings or remove all programming on the device, essentially
turning it into a brick, meaning that it is no longer of any use to
anyone.”247
According to an article published by CNN, remote wiping technology will become a standard addition to all phones produced by
2012) (private searcher was defendant’s biological daughter and the daughter’s mother);
United States v. Tosti, 733 F.3d 816, 819 (9th Cir. 2013) (additional documents, hard drives, a
computer, and DVDs were turned over to police by defendant’s estranged wife); United States
v. Wicks, 73 MJ 93, 96 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (private searcher was a former friend of the defendant
with whom he had a “personal relationship”); People v. Wilkinson, 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 501, 505–
06 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (private searcher was a friend and housemate of defendant).
243. Zack Whittaker, Smartphones ‘remotely wiped’ in police custody, as encryption vs.
law enforcement heats up, ZD NET (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.zdnet.com/article/smartphonesremotely-wiped-in-police-custody-as-encryption-vs-law-enforcement-heats-up/.
244.
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major players in the mobile phone world.248 “Apple, Google, Samsung and Microsoft, along with the five biggest cellular carriers in
the United States, are among those that have signed on to a voluntary program.”249 This voluntary program requires all smartphones
manufactured in the United States after July 2015 to have remote
wiping technology.250 The feature is designed to deter smartphone
theft, a growing problem in the United States, but it has the added
consequence of allowing users to remotely wipe their digital devices should those devices fall into the wrong hands, even the
hands of law enforcement.251 The “kill switch” would allow device
owners to “erase contacts, photos, e-mail and other information,
and lock the phone so it can’t be used without a password.”252
Remote wiping is a particular problem in the time period after
the private actor has turned the device into the police and the police have verified that the device contains criminal material but
before the police are able to obtain a search warrant to view the
rest of the device’s contents. During that limbo period, the device
owner could, theoretically, remotely wipe the device and destroy
any evidence of criminal or illegal activity. This exact problem has
occurred in the United Kingdom.253
In 2014, British police forces encountered at least six individual instances of smartphones being remotely wiped after being
seized by police.254 This remote wiping activity purportedly destroyed “vital evidence as part of ongoing investigations.”255 It does
not take a long amount of time to send a signal to the mobile device
so “even that short period of time after a device has been seized can

248. Doug Gross, ‘Kill Switch’ may be standard on U.S. phones in 2015, CNN (Apr. 16,
2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/16/tech/mobile/ctia-phone-kill-switch/.
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be enough to send through a remotely-activated data kill switch.”256
There does not seem to be any evidence of police forces in the
United States encountering the same issues as British police
forces, but as time goes on, the potential problems created by remote wiping technology could increase as people, especially those
with something to hide, become more aware of the technology and
well versed in its applications.
Another potential technological advancement that could contribute to the destruction of evidence in pre-warrant situations is
a process known as geofencing. Geofencing is a subset of remote
wiping; it is a process by which a device is “configured to automatically wipe all data when the GPS in the device determines that it
has left (or entered) a specific predetermined geographic area. This
method may also employ WiFi towers for location determination as
well.”257 Theoretically, geofencing technology could be used by
criminals to lock down and/or remotely wipe digital devices that
come within a certain distance to a police station. In that sense, if
the police confiscate the device from the private searcher and take
that device to their headquarters, the act of entering the predetermined GPS coordinates could trigger the digital device to destroy
its contents.
The technologies of remote wiping and geofencing could lend
support to the “zone is the physical device” theory supported by the
Fifth and Seventh Circuits. One could argue that the government
should be able to view the entire contents of a digital device for
evidence of criminal activity if there is a substantial risk of those
contents being erased before the government can obtain a search
warrant. If the device is erased before the search warrant is
granted, the government is effectively unable to prosecute individuals for criminal activity, despite strong evidence of illegal actions.258

256.
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257. RICK AYERS, SAM BROTHERS, & WAYNE JANSEN, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS &
TECH,
GUIDELINES ON MOBILE DEVICE FORENSICS
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(2014),
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This argument is almost flatly rejected by the Supreme Court
in Riley v. California.259 As Chief Justice Roberts pointed out, in
his Riley opinion, law enforcement has means to address the problem of remote wiping.260 For example, officers could simply turn the
phone or other device off or remove the device’s battery so it cannot
connect to a network.261 Additionally, David Bennett suggests two
other ways officers could ensure the device is unable to be remotely
accessed: use of a Faraday bag and use of a radio frequency
shielded test enclosure box.262
A Faraday bag is a plastic-coated, radio frequency (RF)
shielded bag “used to shield a mobile device from external contact.”263 If the device is placed in a Faraday bag, it cannot reach a
wireless signal, thereby making remote wiping or geofencing an
impossibility as long as the device remains in the bag.264 A radio
frequency shielded test enclosure box is similar to the Faraday bag
in that it isolates the device from the cellular network.265 This prevents communication with the device, including GPS communication.266
In addition to the use of practical, network limiting technologies, there exists a judicial remedy to allow government agents to
conduct searches if they have a reasonable fear of destruction of
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evidence.267 This remedy is known as a search under exigent circumstances, also known as the exigency doctrine.268 The exigency
doctrine, as applied to Fourth Amendment searches and seizures,
allows the needs of law enforcement to compel a warrantless
search based on objectively reasonable determinations.269 An objectively reasonable determination could be found in cases where
there is a need to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.270
Government agents, in such a situation, are justified in circumventing the Fourth Amendment “by the existence of exigent circumstances [requiring] the officer to act immediately without [a]
warrant or consent.”271
The exigency doctrine is not a savings provision; it is very
much the exception to the general rule.272 In the typical case, government agents will not be justified by the exigency doctrine in
searching the entire device. Government agents should only be permitted to invoke the exigency doctrine when there is a real danger
that the evidence contained on the device will be imminently destroyed before the agents can obtain a warrant to search the entire
device. Only in these situations will it be objectively reasonable for
the government agents to be permitted to violate the suspect’s
Fourth Amendment rights. While destruction of evidence in specific cases may support a finding of exigency, it should not do so
categorically, and the prevailing test for determining permissible
scope should be the “zone is the virtual file” approach.
Even though it is important for government agents to be permitted to search devices for incriminating material, government
agents should not be permitted to circumvent well-established
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to do so. With the use of technologies such as the Faraday bag, increased governmental intrusion in regards to permitting law enforcement to search an entire
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digital device in excess of a private search is not justified. Law enforcement agencies have the capabilities to preserve digital evidence until warrants can be obtained; therefore, these agencies
should not be permitted to trample upon defendants’ Fourth
Amendment rights. Even in situations where law enforcement
agencies may lack such technologies as Faraday bags or radio frequency shielded test enclosure boxes, they can always simply
power down the device so it cannot connect to a WiFi or cellular
network. Additionally, in very rare circumstances, the exigency
doctrine exists to save vital evidence from the risk of true destruction. With these alternatives, adoption of the “zone is the digital
device” theory is unnecessary.
2. Avoiding Unnecessary Judicial and Law Enforcement Costs
Another argument in support of allowing government law enforcement agencies to search the whole digital device as permitted
by the Fifth and Seventh Circuits is the idea that requiring a warrant to search devices for which the expectation of privacy has arguably already been frustrated by the private actor and which contain criminal activity is a waste of judicial time and resources.273 In
essence, this argument pronounces that law enforcement agents
should be able to view the entire contents of the device because
they can be virtually certain that the device contains criminal activity. This virtual certainty is accomplished by the fact that the
law enforcement agents have already viewed illegal activity on the
device, the evidence offered by the private actor.
This argument is flawed for the following reasons. First, as
will be discussed in the next section, the unique characteristics of
digital devices make the virtual certainty requirement of Jacobsen
a pragmatic impossibility. Even if agents could be certain that the
device contains images of child pornography or evidence of financial fraud, for example, the agents could not be certain of what else
the device could contain. Digital devices have immense storage capacity and the capability of holding numerous discrete forms of information. The only virtual certainty an agent could possibly have
in the digital device is that the specific file or image viewed contains illegal activity. This virtual certainty only exists in the specific file or image viewed. It does not exist for the rest of the device.
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Second, while the resources of law enforcement agencies and
the judiciary are of important consideration, concerns of depleting
resources should not be enough to overcome the strong constitutional protections of the Fourth Amendment. The Fifth Circuit reasons, in United States v. Runyan, that warrants are costly and time
consuming to obtain.274 While this may have been true when
Runyan was decided in 2001, the Supreme Court case of Missouri
v. McNeely,275 makes clear that technological advancements in the
warrant application process have made obtaining warrants
quicker and much less costly.276 As amended, the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure allow warrants to be issued by telephone or
other electronic means.277 Additionally, “well over a majority of
States allow police officers or prosecutors to apply for search warrants remotely through various means, including telephonic or radio communication, electronic communication such as e-mail, and
video conferencing.”278 States have also streamlined the warrant
process by using standard forms for certain applications.279
While telecommunications innovations have not, by any
means, “eliminate[d] all delay from the warrant-application process,”280 they have enabled law enforcement agents to obtain warrants through a quicker and more streamlined process.281 For that
reason, the argument in favor of allowing law enforcement agents
the ability to search the whole device fails. The unique characteristics of digital devices and the inherent potential for abuse in allowing law enforcement wide discretion and latitude counsel
against the adoption of the “zone is the digital device” theory. Only
the “zone is the virtual file” approach accurately and adequately
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takes into account the competing interests at stake in digital device
searches.
B. The Arguments for Adopting the Virtual File Approach & Why
Such a Limited Approach is Desirable
The virtual file theory acknowledges technological advancements in digital devices, advancements in the jurisprudential system and the unwavering intent of the Founding Fathers in passing
the Fourth Amendment. For that reason, it is the proper approach
to be taken in determining permissible scope. This section will discuss the important policy arguments in support of the virtual file
approach.
1. The Intent of the Founding Fathers and the Ratifying
Generation in the Passage of the Fourth Amendment
The “zone is the virtual file” approach adopted by the Sixth
and Eleventh Circuits comports most accurately and completely
with the intent of the Founding Fathers in the passage of the
Fourth Amendment. This section will give some historical background on the passage of the Fourth Amendment, specifically
showing how the Fourth Amendment was passed to ensure adequate safeguards were implemented to prevent the creation of a
police state. It will also discuss how allowing the “zone is the digital
device” approach is contrary to the intentions of the Founding Fathers, which were to require specificity and concrete limitations to
unchecked and arbitrary governmental intrusion on private citizen
life.
The Fourth Amendment was placed in the Constitution by our
Founding Fathers and the ratifying generation in response to the
fear of allowing searches and seizures of a person’s property and
home without probable cause.282 In Great Britain, in the early to
mid 1700s, searches without probable cause were commonplace,
and “general warrants allowed the Crown’s messengers to search
without any cause to believe someone had committed an offense.”283
Perhaps the most prolific example of the unchecked power of the
British government to invade the privacy of its citizens through
general warrants was the case of John Wilkes, a member of the

282.

Friedman & Kerr, supra note 26.

283.

Id.

2017

IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRIVATE SEARCH DOCTRINE IN
A DIGITAL AGE: ADVOCATING FOR LIMITATIONS ON
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES THROUGH ADOPTION OF
THE VIRTUAL FILE APPROACH

825

British Parliament and staunch critic of the expansive and unbridled policies of the government.284
In 1762, Wilkes published an anonymous series of pamphlets
which criticized the search and seizure policies of the British government.285 Embittered with the constant and increasingly adverse
critique of its administration, the British government launched an
attack against the authors of these pamphlets, the identities of
whom were unknown by the government at the time.286 The Secretary of State, Lord Halifax, issued a general warrant of arrest to
four individuals, “ordering them to make strict and diligent search
for the authors, printers, and publishers of a seditious and treasonable paper . . . and them, or any of them, having found, to apprehend and seize, together with their papers.”287
The problem with this warrant was its lack of specificity.288 As
discussed by Nelson B. Lasson in his book examining the early
background development of the Fourth Amendment, Halifax’s warrant was so general “as to the persons to be arrested and the places
to be searched and the papers to be seized” that “probable cause
upon oath could necessarily have no place in it since the very questions as to whom the messengers should arrest, where they should
search, and what they should seize, were given over into their absolute discretion.”289
Imbued with the authority of the general warrant, the four
messengers proceeded to arrest forty-nine individuals in three
days upon simple suspicion of seditious activity, oftentimes taking
individuals from their beds during the night.290 After apprehending
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the actual printer of the pamphlets, the messengers learned that
Wilkes was the author, arrested him, and removed all of Wilkes’s
private papers from his home.291 Wilkes and the other printers arrested brought suit against the British government for false imprisonment.292 Chief Justice Pratt declared the general warrant to
be illegal and a gross abuse of power by the Secretary of State.293
The Chief Justice stated:
The defendants claimed a right under precedents to force
persons’ houses, break open escritoires, seize their papers,
upon a general warrant, where no inventory is made of the
things taken away, and where no offenders’ names are specified in the warrant, and therefore a discretionary power
given to messengers to search wherever their suspicions
may chance to fall. If such a power is truly invested in a
secretary of state, and he can delegate this power, it certainly may affect the person and property of every man in
this kingdom, and is totally subversive of the liberty of the
subject.294
In the aftermath of the American revolution, the newly independent Americans decided to break from British tradition and
placed “the right against unreasonable search and seizure on a constitutional footing.”295 The many state constitutions in the emerging United States of America not only disallowed general warrants;
“they also elevated specific warrants, probable cause, and the idea
of unreasonable search and seizure to the position of higher law.”296
With the memory of the Wilkes case and the language of thirteen
state constitutions in mind, Congress passed the Fourth Amendment as part of the Bill of Rights on September 25th, 1789.297 The
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ultimate goal of the Fourth Amendment is to “protect people’s right
to privacy and freedom from arbitrary governmental intrusions.”298
This goal reflects the familiar maxim that “a man’s home is his
castle,” and “makes plain . . . that the Constitution does not tolerate the tactics of a police state.”299
The history and jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment inform this issue of permissible scope of the subsequent government
search in at least a couple ways. First, connections can be made
between a digital storage device and a house, such that the special
protections regarding “a man’s castle” and the unique limitations
of the private search doctrine as applied to residences work to limit
the permissible scope of the subsequent government search to the
virtual files searched by the private actor. Second, the prohibition
against general warrants discussed above and the unwavering desire for specificity in Fourth Amendment applications mandate a
virtual file approach and reject the digital device approach.
a. Similarities Between Digital Devices and Houses
A digital storage device is not unlike a house. In essence, a
digital storage device contains many of the same things as a house
might contain – photos, cameras, videos, video players, libraries,
diaries, albums, televisions, maps, newspapers, etc. A digital storage device is essentially a house for your consciousness; it stores
many of your thoughts, your concerns, your dreams, and your
doubts. It can very well be described as a “sanctuary” for those
thoughts, and as such is deserving of special protection.
In Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the house has received
such special protection.300 “Indeed, the physical entry into the home
has been described as the ‘chief evil against which the wording of
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the Fourth Amendment is directed.’”301 It has been pronounced
that “a sane, decent, civilized society must provide some such oasis,
some shelter from public scrutiny, some insulated enclosure, some
enclave, some inviolate place which is a man’s castle.”302
The home receives special protection as well under the private
search doctrine. As the Sixth Circuit decided in United States v.
Allen,303 the private search doctrine does not apply to searches of
residences.304 A person’s expectation of privacy is not extinguished
if a private actor searches the person’s residence.305 The person still
has an expectation of privacy in the contents of his residence.306 If
a government agent, upon information from the private searcher,
opens containers within the home not opened by the private
searcher, the government agent has violated the person’s Fourth
Amendment rights.307 Simply by searching the house generally, the
private actor does not destroy the expectation of privacy specifically.308
The residence protection applies well to the subject of digital
storage devices. As discussed above, digital storage devices are sufficiently similar to houses to be subject to the same Fourth Amendment policy protections. In fact, Chief Justice Roberts in his Riley
opinion noted this very problem and said:
Indeed, a cell phone search would typically expose to the
government far more than the most exhaustive search of a
house: A phone not only contains in digital form many sensitive records previously found in the home; it also contains
a broad array of private information never found in a home
in any form—unless the phone is.309
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In applying the principles regarding physical searches of residences to digital containers, it becomes clear that the proper approach to determining the scope of a permissible governmental
search is the virtual file approach. In essence, the digital device is
the home and any file, image, or document contained upon the device can be analogized to a box or container within the home. In
order to open additional files, images, or documents on the device,
those files, images, or documents must first have been opened by
the private actor. As the world becomes increasingly digital, with
more and more activity done online rather than in reality, this comparison only becomes more concrete.
b. The Prohibition Against Lack of Specificity Mandates a Virtual
File Approach.
As the Wilkes case, discussed supra, makes clear, specificity in
warrant applications and in searches and seizures is a must, not a
suggestion. The Supreme Court in Jacobsen picked up on this mandate of specificity in its requirement of virtual certainty in application of the private search doctrine. But, as will be discussed infra, is it even possible to have virtual certainty regarding the contents of a digital device, without first searching every last piece of
data on the device?
Digital devices have an inherent lack of specificity in regards
to knowing the contents of the device and being able to pinpoint
with virtual certainty the allegedly criminal material. It is very
improbable that a person’s entire digital device will only contain
criminal material. It is much more likely that the device will contain anything and everything from pictures to e-books, videos to
addresses, medical records to diary entries. As Jacobsen pronounced, the critical measures in determining whether the government search exceeds the scope of the private search are how much
private information the government stands to gain when it re-examines the evidence and how certain it is regarding what it will
find.310
If the government agent is permitted to use the “zone is the
digital device” approach, the agent stands to gain every piece of
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information ever viewed or downloaded on the device. The government agent cannot possibly be certain that every piece of information on the device will contain criminal material. The government agent cannot even be virtually certain that every piece of information on the device will contain criminal material. For that
reason, the “zone is the digital device” theory goes against every
limitation in Jacobsen and against everything the Fourth Amendment was passed to prevent. Permitting the government agent to
search every file, image, or document on a suspect’s private device,
without first obtaining a warrant, is akin to allowing government
agents to ransack every container within a person’s home for evidence of alleged criminal activity, an action clearly outlawed by the
Wilkes decision and numerous decisions following.
Chief Justice Pratt, in the quoted language discussed supra,
established that to allow a government agent to search wherever
his “suspicions may chance to fall” would be to allow an act so subversive to liberty that it would go against every protection we have
against unreasonable search and seizure.311 The digital device approach allows the government agent to search the entire device,
wherever his suspicions may chance to fall. Only the virtual file
approach and the exposed data approach impose limitations on
this broad and virtually unchecked power. Of course, it becomes a
different question when the government agent has obtained a warrant and is searching a digital device upon the authority of that
warrant. In that case, as long as the warrant is specific and lawful,
the reasons for limiting government searches of digital devices become less convincing. In private search doctrine cases, however,
the government agents are proceeding without a warrant; as such,
their actions in searching digital devices should be limited.
Warrants present limitations on the power of law enforcement. When abolishing the warrant requirement, the judiciary
should be very careful to preserve the important privacy interests
of citizens. To allow the agents to search the whole device, without
a warrant, simply because a private actor viewed one, single file on
the device is to provide too broad a license of investigation and suspicion. The virtual file approach presents a needed limitation on
the powers of law enforcement, and thus should be the approach
adopted in private search doctrine cases where the evidence at issue is a digital device.
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2. The Nature and Pervasive Use of Digital Devices
Digital devices present unique attributes that distinguish
them from physical containers. Cell phones (and other digital devices) have immense storage capacity. Cell phones, alone, can act
as “cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers.”312 Before the advent of modern digital devices, a search was limited by
the fact that most people couldn’t, and even if they could likely
wouldn’t, carry “every piece of mail they have received for the past
several months, every picture they have taken, or every book or
article they have read . . . .”313 Digital devices make this physical
impossibility not only possible but also quite probable and make
prior search limitations inapplicable. The resulting possible intrusion on privacy interests for digital devices is not physically limited
in the same way a possible intrusion on privacy interests for physical devices is.
As Chief Justice Roberts pointed out in Riley, “the current topselling smart phone has a standard capacity of 16 gigabytes (and
is available with up to 64 gigabytes). Sixteen gigabytes translates
to millions of pages of text, thousands of pictures, or hundreds of
videos.”314 Even basic phones without such capacity have the ability to hold text and picture messages, a person’s calendar and
schedule, thousands of personal contacts, photographs, and for
those phones with network capabilities, an Internet browsing history.315
In the short time since Riley was passed, the computer technology market has expanded even further than sixteen gigabyte
standard models. In fact, Samsung is introducing a sixteen terabyte
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model to the consumer hard drive market sometime in 2016.316 Sixteen terabytes translates to roughly 272,000 hours of music, 16,000
hours of video, or 4,960,000 photos.317 With the constantly changing nature of the digital technology market, it is not inconceivable
to conclude that this storage capacity will continue to increase for
years to come.
The problem is compounded when you consider the pervasiveness of digital devices. Cell phones, and other devices “are now
such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial
visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature
of human anatomy. A smart phone . . . was unheard of ten years
ago; a significant majority . . . now own such phones.”318 In fact, a
study conducted in 2015 regarding smartphone usage in the
United States revealed that “64% of American adults own a
smartphone of some kind.”319 The percentage increases to 85%
among young adults.320
Especially concerning for our purposes is the quality of the information accessed on digital devices. Smartphones are much more
than the typical telephone of yesteryear in that they are used for
more than just to call and text people.321 According to the PEW Research Center survey, a significant number of adult smartphone
owners used their phones during the year to “look up information
about a health condition” (62%), participate in online banking
(57%), “look up real estate listings” (44%), search for job information (43%), search for government services (40%), “take a class
or get educational content” (30%), and submit job applications
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If the pervasiveness and quality of usage regarding digital
storage devices is not enough to convince of the need to limit governmental power to search digital devices, it is worth noting that
digital devices present the added problem of connectivity to the
cloud, as noted infra in our discussion of Riley v. California. As the
Ninth Circuit noted in United States v. Cotterman, digital devices
are “conduit[s] to retrieving information from the cloud, akin to the
key to a safe deposit box.”324 Just by having access to the digital
device itself, a person has access to every account and offsite store
of information a person possesses. With that in mind it is difficult
to argue that allowing law enforcement access to the whole digital
device is not an abuse of discretion and in direct violation of everything for which the Fourth Amendment stands.
3. The Impossibility of “Virtual Certainty” Regarding the
Contents of Digital Containers
Due to the unique characteristics of digital devices, it is virtually impossible for law enforcement to be sufficiently certain of
what they will find upon the digital device. For that reason,
searches of the whole digital device cannot satisfy the “virtual certainty” requirement of Jacobsen. Digital device searches “tend to
be unusually invasive.”325 Digital evidence, likewise, often can reveal so much more evidence, in both quality and quantity, than
physical evidence.326 When one opens a physical container, the contents inside are fixed, meaning just by viewing the inside of the
container, you can know with “virtual certainty” what that container will hold. The same cannot be said of a digital container.
When one opens a digital folder on a computer, it is not immediately obvious what that folder contains. A private actor could
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open the folder and find evidence of child pornography through images and videos. However, unless the private actor views every single data file in that folder, the folder’s contents are still a mystery.
The only thing the private actor knows with certainty is that the
opened images and videos contain child pornography.
When the private actor then replicates the search for the government agent, the government agent is limited to the level of certainty the private actor had. The agent does not gain additional
certainty regarding the contents of the container just by his or her
expertise. The risk that the government agent, if allowed to search
the whole folder, or the whole device, will find private information
for which the expectation of privacy has not been frustrated is too
great to allow such latitude. The subsequent government search
cannot possibly satisfy the “virtual certainty” requirement of Jacobsen, and therefore, the subsequent search exceeds the scope of
the private search and is impermissible without a warrant.
The foregoing policy discussion strongly mandates a finding
that the only permissible search technique to be used in private
search doctrine cases of digital devices is the virtual file approach.
In this sense, the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have it correct. These circuits see that the virtual file approach is the only
approach that adequately and unwaveringly preserves the purpose
of the Fourth Amendment and ensures we, as a nation, remain free
from arbitrary governmental intrusion.
VII. CONCLUSION
As this comment makes evident, there are many dangers in
allowing a subsequent government search, following a private
search, to view the whole contents of a digital storage device. For
that reason, the proper approach to determining the scope of the
subsequent government search should be that of the Sixth, Ninth,
and Eleventh Circuits, finding that the government search is limited in scope to the individual images or files viewed by the private
actor. This approach preserves the reasonable expectation of privacy that device owners have in their property, furthers the goals
of the Fourth Amendment, and prevents abuse of discretion by law
enforcement officers.

